Regulatory Leveraging: Problem or Solution? by Kovacic, William E. & Hyman, David A.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2016 
Regulatory Leveraging: Problem or Solution? 
William E. Kovacic 
George Washington University Law School, wkovacic@law.gwu.edu 
David A. Hyman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kovacic, William E. and Hyman, David A., Regulatory Leveraging: Problem or Solution? (August 22, 2016). 
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-41; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2016-41. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817339 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817339 
REGULATORY LEVERAGING: PROBLEM OR SOLUTION? 
William E. Kovacic* and David A. Hyman**
“Nice merger you’ve got here. 
It would be a shame if anything was to happen to it.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Worldwide, there are approximately 130 jurisdictions with 
competition laws.2 The governmental entities charged with enforcing these 
laws are typically called “competition agencies,”3 but many of these entities 
do things other than competition law. Of the thirty-six agencies listed in the 
Global Competition Review’s 2015 annual review, half have 
responsibilities beyond their competition portfolio.4 The particulars vary 
from country to country, but a list of the usual suspects would include 
consumer protection; public procurement; and public utility access, pricing, 
* Visiting Professor, King’s College London, Global Competition Professor of Law and
Policy, George Washington University Law School, and Non-Executive Director, United 
Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority. From 2006 to 2011, he served as a member 
of the Federal Trade Commission and chaired the agency from March 2008 to March 2009. 
** H. Ross and Helen Workman Chair in Law, University of Illinois Colleges of Law and 
Medicine. From 2001-2004, he served as Special Counsel at the Federal Trade Commission. 
The views expressed here are the authors’ alone. The authors are grateful to participants in 
workshops at Heidelberg University, Pembroke College of Oxford University, Rutgers 
University Graduate School of Management, the University of Amsterdam, and the 
University of Mannheim for many helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 See Barry Popik, “Nice Place You Got Here. Be a Shame if Anything Happened to It.” 
(July 15, 2009), 
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/nice_place_you_got_here_be_a
_shame_if_anything_happened_to_it (tracing historical usage of the phrase). See also Monty 
Python’s Flying Circus: Army Protection Racket, YOUTUBE, 1:41–1:49 (Nov. 13, 2015) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pm5mtpPtW1Q [hereinafter Monty Python]. 
“Dino: You’ve . . . you’ve got a nice army base here, Colonel. 
Colonel: Yes. 
Dino: We wouldn’t want anything to happen to it.” 
2 See William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future Influence on Global 
Competition Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1157, 1158 n.7 (2015) (discussing global 
expansion in the number of competition agencies). 
3 For example, in a planning document issued in 2011, the International Competition 
Network describes the creation of the network in 2001 “by 15 competition agencies” and 
observes that its membership “has since grown to 117 competition agencies.” 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, THE ICN’S VISION FOR ITS SECOND DECADE 1 
(May, 2011), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc755.pdf. 
4 See generally Rating Enforcement: The Annual Ranking of the World’s Leading 
Competition Authorities, 18 GLOB. COMPETITION REV. passim (2015).  
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and regulation.5 Several competition agencies also have the power to apply 
broad public interest standards,6 or must implement expansive scalable 
commands, such as the Federal Trade Commission’s power to proscribe 
“unfair methods of competition.”7 
In previous work, we have examined how the assignment of 
multiple functions/areas of regulatory responsibility affects governmental 
agency performance.8 Among other issues, we have considered the impact 
of the mix of assigned tasks (i.e., whether the tasks are substitutes or 
complements, and whether they aim at consistent ends); the impact of the 
number and scope of assigned regulatory tasks on the likelihood of capture; 
and the implementation costs and reputational consequences of having 
multifunction agencies.9  
In this article, we extend our analysis to consider regulatory 
leveraging. Assume a competition agency that has significant regulatory 
power, such as the right to review certain mergers before they are 
consummated. Pursuant to this authority, the agency determines how 
quickly mergers are cleared, or whether they can proceed at all. This 
regulatory power is the functional equivalent of the market power that some 
private firms enjoy. Further assume that the agency has responsibilities 
beyond its competition portfolio—say, with regard to privacy and data 
security. A firm seeks the approval of the agency to merge with another 
company. What should we think if the agency uses its regulatory power in 
policy domain A (i.e., merger approval) to extract concessions with respect 
to policy domain B (i.e., privacy and data security)? Is that a good idea or a 
5 See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy 
Portfolios: Divide or Conquer?, in COMPETITION LAW ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: DAVID 
GERBER’S GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 33, 33–34 (Nicolas Charbit & Elisa 
Ramundo eds., 2013). 
6 For example, the merger control mechanism in South Africa’s competition law obliges the 
competition authority to account for a variety of public interest considerations. See DAVID 
LEWIS, ENFORCING COMPETITION RULES IN SOUTH AFRICA: THIEVES AT THE DINNER TABLE 
111–12 (2012). See also id., at 117–28 (discussing the design and operation of South 
Africa’s public interest test). 
7 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). The origins and aims of this provision are examined in 
William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930–39 (2010). 
8 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 5, at 33, 42; William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, 
Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295 
(2016) [hereinafter Kovacic & Hyman, Consume or Invest]; David A. Hyman & William E. 
Kovacic, Can’t Anyone Here Play This Game? Judging the FTC’s Critics, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1948, 1973–74, n.151 (2015); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who 
Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1446 (2014) [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Who Does What]; David A. Hyman & 
William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of Competition 
Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163 (2013); William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, 
Competition Agency Design: What’s on the Menu? 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 527 (2012).  
9 See, e.g., Hyman & Kovacic, Who Does What, supra note 8. 
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bad idea? Does your response differ if the agency is using its regulatory 
authority in policy domain A to obtain concessions that it could not obtain, 
or could realize only with great difficulty, if it focused solely on the 
behavior of the firm in policy domain B? What if the agency is using its 
regulatory authority in policy domain A to obtain concessions in policy 
domain B that would be unconstitutional if it sought to impose them 
directly? Does it make a difference if the agency has no regulatory 
authority over policy domain B? What if the agency does not have 
regulatory authority over policy domain B, but a different agency, which 
does have that authority, has asked the competition agency to seek the 
concessions at issue? Stated bluntly, is regulatory leveraging a troublesome 
problem—or a useful solution?  
Part I describes leveraging in the private and public sectors. Part II 
provides four case studies of public sector leveraging. Part III considers the 
costs and benefits of regulatory leveraging. Part IV offers several 
suggestions for increasing the likelihood that leveraging is used for pro-
social ends.  Part V flags the existence of the converse problem/issue – i.e., 
leveraging regulators.  
 
I. LEVERAGING 101 
 
“Leveraging” refers to one party exploiting a position of power to 
gain an advantage over a counterparty.10 We introduce the concept of 
leveraging by describing its application in competition law, and then by 
describing analogous forms of behavior undertaken by public regulatory 
agencies.   
 
A. Private Sector Leveraging 
 
Private sector leveraging occurs when a firm uses market power 
over Product A to distort rivalry for sales of Product B.11 If a firm has 
market power over Product A, it can harm competition over Product B by 
“tying” the purchase of the two products together.12 Consumers who want 
Product A can be forced to buy Product B, even if they would not do so 
otherwise. Similarly, the firm with market power over Product A can 
                                                
10 See Leverage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining leverage as 
“[p]ositional advantage that may well help a person get what he or she wants from others. . . 
.”). 
11 See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 
202–12 (2003). 
12 See David S. Evans et al., A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analyzing Legitimate 
Tying Cases, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY: ECONOMIC ISSUES & IMPACTS 297, 305–06 
(David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla eds., 2004) (explaining how tying may assist firms in 
leveraging market power from one product to another). 
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protect its position against market entry by firms that make complements 
that might become substitutes.13 Competition law addresses these risks by 
selectively prohibiting some (but not all) forms of tying, bundling, and 
loyalty discounts.14 More controversially, some competition agencies have 
targeted the “portfolio effects” of proposed mergers.15 These examples 
make it clear that some forms of private leveraging have anticompetitive 
consequences, and raise concerns that competition law has addressed.  
 
B. Public Sector (Regulatory) Leveraging 
 
The public sector analog of private leveraging occurs in several 
ways. In the main case, an agency uses its gatekeeping power within one 
policy domain to alter the behavior of firms in other policy domains.16 
Regulatory leveraging also can take place within a single policy domain, 
where an agency uses its gatekeeping power with respect to one component 
of that domain to obtain concessions from firms concerning a separate 
element of the policy domain.17 
Regulatory leveraging allows the agency to exploit its gatekeeping 
authority in several ways. In some instances, leveraging enables the agency 
to secure results that it might not have been able to achieve otherwise. In 
others, leveraging permits the agency to attain those results without 
recourse to other policy tools that the agency regards as more costly or 
risky to use.  
What kind of gatekeeping power makes regulatory leveraging 
                                                
13 This was essentially the Department of Justice’s theory in the Microsoft case, which inter 
alia involved the claim that Microsoft’s bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows 95 and 
Windows 98 violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d. 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice 
Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer 
Software Markets (May 18, 1998) (“The complaint . . . charges that Microsoft recognized 
that the success of Netscape’s internet browser threatened Microsoft’s Windows monopoly 
on PC operating systems.”). On the role of the tying allegations in the Justice Department’s 
suit against Microsoft, see ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST 
CASES 61–66 (2014). 
14 See ROBERT O’DONOGHUE & A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 
EC 381–84, 491–511 (2006) (describing application of European Union competition law to 
bundling, loyalty discounts, and tying). See also Evans, et al., supra note 12, at 299; 
HYLTON, supra note 11, at 202–12. 
15 See THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLICY 
ROUNDTABLES: PORTFOLIO EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 19 (2001), 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/1818237.pdf. See also Thomas L. Ruffner, Note, 
The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The Return of Portfolio-Effects Theory? 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1285,1321 (2003) (describing application of portfolio effects theory in European 
Commission’s challenge to General Electric’s effort to acquire Honeywell).  
16 See infra Part II.A. 
17 See infra Part II.B-C. 
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possible? The most obvious form of gatekeeping takes place when the 
agency has ex ante approval authority over something that the regulated 
entity wants, such as a license to operate in a given market (e.g., the right to 
operate a radio station, or the franchise to offer cable TV services) or to 
introduce a product (e.g., to sell a pharmaceutical). Without the regulator’s 
ex ante approval, the firm cannot offer its intended service or product. A 
second form of gatekeeping power is created by laws that require firms to 
notify the regulator in advance of a contemplated measure (e.g., a merger). 
Such laws require the expiration of a waiting period before the proposed 
action may be taken. These laws give the regulator an opportunity to study 
the proposed course of action, subject to a deadline that forces action within 
a specified time.  
In competition law, the second scenario arises frequently in merger 
control. In 1976, the United States established what has become the leading 
model for modern merger control by enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR”).18 As implemented by rules 
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, HSR requires the merging 
parties to provide notice of certain proposed transactions to the FTC, and 
establishes a mandatory waiting period during which the FTC or the 
Department of Justice can decide whether to compel the production of 
additional information.19 When the parties have produced the required 
information, the antitrust agencies have a fixed period of time in which to 
decide whether to challenge the merger.20 The parties cannot proceed until 
the waiting period expires, or until the antitrust agency indicates that it will 
not oppose the deal.21 One recent survey of global merger practice 
identifies roughly seventy jurisdictions that have variants of the HSR 
premerger notification and mandatory waiting period system.22  
HSR and similar regulatory regimes have transformed merger 
review from an ex post assessment of completed transactions into ex ante 
review of proposed deals.23 Most merger-related litigation has been 
replaced by negotiated settlements, resulting in either outright approval, 
                                                
18 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)). 
19 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 394–401 (7th ed. 
2012) (discussing the requirements of the HSR mechanism). 
20 Id. at 397–98; DOUGLAS BRODER, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND ENFORCEMENT: A PRACTICE 
INTRODUCTION 137 (2010). 
21 BRODER, supra note 20, at 137. 
22 GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2016, at 450–79 (John Davies, ed., 
2016). 
23 For analysis of this transformation, see Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by 
Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 ORE. L. REV. 1383 (1998); 
E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy 
in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L. REV. 997 (1986). 
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divestitures, or conduct remedies.24 The HSR merger approval process is 
tailor-made for the exercise of regulatory leverage, since firms prefer an 
expedited resolution, and are willing to make concessions to accomplish 
that goal.25 Stated differently, when time is of the essence—as it is in many 
mergers—the agency will have considerable regulatory leverage. Of course, 
if the agency overreaches, the regulated entity may be willing to walk away 
from the transaction, or force the agency to go to federal district court to 
enjoin the merger. Thus, there are limits to the concessions an agency can 
extract. Yet the basic point remains the same: when a regulatory agency 
controls access to a valuable resource, it can use that power to extract a 
variety of concessions from regulated entities that want access to that 
resource. 
Perhaps less obviously, agencies can also use “global settlements,” 
which reach beyond the specific controversy they are handling, to obtain 
leverage over ancillary domains.26 If a company wants to put a dispute in 
policy domain A behind it, it may be open to concessions in policy domain 
B—even though the agency would otherwise lack the regulatory authority 
to impose that result on its own.  
Is regulatory leveraging a normal, legitimate, and perhaps 
inevitable feature of agency design? Or is it the equivalent of “hostage 
taking,” with the regulated entity forced to pay Danegeld in order to be left 
in peace?27 We focus our consideration of that issue with four case studies 
of regulatory leveraging.  
 
II. FOUR CASE STUDIES OF REGULATORY LEVERAGING 
 
As we suggested above, regulatory leveraging can take place in 
several scenarios. First, a regulator can seek to leverage its power across 
distinct areas within a single policy domain. Second, a multipurpose agency 
can leverage power across distinct policy domains within its portfolio of 
duties. Third, a regulator can use the gatekeeping power of another agency 
to obtain concessions from a firm that is subject to oversight by both 
agencies. Fourth, an agency can use a public interest mandate to achieve 
commitments that are not authorized by more specific legal commands. 
                                                
24 See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 1001 (“[T]he Antitrust Division has changed from a 
traditional, litigation-oriented enforcement agency to a regulatory agency. The Antitrust 
Division, as an economic regulator, has adopted a negotiational rather than adversarial 
posture.”). 
25 BRODER, supra note 20, at 189–90. 
26 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 215 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
27 But see RUDYARD KIPLING, Dane-Geld (A.D. 980-1016), in A KIPLING ANTHOLOGY: 
VERSE 184–85 (1922) (“if once you have paid him the Dane-geld.  You never get rid of the 
Dane.”) 
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Below we offer case studies of each scenario. 
 
A. Bosch-SPX: Leveraging Across Two Antitrust Domains 
 
In 2012, the FTC resolved two matters involving Robert Bosch 
GmbH.28 The first matter involved Bosch’s proposed acquisition of SPX 
Service Solutions U.S. LLC (“SPX”).29 The transaction would have given 
Bosch a “virtual monopoly in the market for air conditioning recycling, 
recovery, and recharge (ACRRR) devices.”30 That issue was resolved with 
an agreement by Bosch to divest its automotive air-conditioner repair 
equipment business, and make some licensing commitments.31  
The same FTC press release went on to announce that the 
Commission and Bosch had resolved an entirely separate dispute over 
whether SPX had harmed competition by reneging “on a commitment to 
license key, standard-essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The FTC alleged that SPX reneged on its 
obligation to license on FRAND terms by seeking injunctions against 
willing licensees of those patents.”32 
 Bosch agreed to abandon SPX’s claims for injunctive 
relief, resolving an ancillary matter that long preceded the proposed 
merger.33 The FTC had authority to review Bosch’s proposed 
merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, and to challenge SPX’s 
conduct under Section 5 of the FTC Act.34 
It is not clear from the FTC’s press release how these two entirely 
distinct issues came to be settled simultaneously.35 But the fact that they 
appear in the same press release certainly leads us to believe they were 
resolved as a package deal. Would the SPX matter have been resolved on 
the same terms and within the same time frame if the FTC had pursued that 
matter independently, by pursuing a separate case premised on Section 5 of 
the FTC Act? Would the SPX matter have been resolved on the same terms 
and within the same time frame if Bosch did not have a merger pending 
                                                
28 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Order Restores Competition in U.S. Market for 
Equipment Used to Recharge Vehicle Air Conditioning Systems (Nov. 26, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-order-restores-competition-us-
market-equipment-used-recharge [hereinafter FTC Vehicle Air Conditioning Systems Press 
Release]. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731–32 (1914) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)); Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 
717, 719–21 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)).  
35 See FTC Vehicle Air Conditioning Systems Press Release, supra note 28. 
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before the FTC? Bosch certainly had a huge incentive to give in on the SPX 
matter in order to obtain speedy approval of the proposed merger—and 
FTC personnel knew that. No one at the FTC has to say “nice merger 
you’ve got there; it would be a shame if anything was to happen to it,” for 
those seeking agency approval to understand how the game will be 
played.36  
 
B. Data Protection/Privacy and Merger Approval: Cross-Domain 
Leveraging by a Multipurpose Regulator  
 
Over the past few years, the way in which private firms use data— 
how they collect it, how they use it, and how they distribute it to third 
parties—has become a major policy concern in the United States and 
abroad.37 Should regulatory policies in this space be developed on an 
industry-wide basis, through notice-and-comment regulation? Or should 
privacy policy result from enforcement actions against bad actors? Might 
merger review provide an opportunity for regulatory leverage in this space? 
The FTC, the principal U.S. data protection authority,38 confronted these 
issues in two merger reviews involving Google—in 2007, when Google 
sought regulatory approval for its acquisition of DoubleClick,39 and in 
2010, when the FTC reviewed Google’s purchase of AdMob.40  
In both transactions, agency personnel debated whether the merger 
review process should include an evaluation of Google’s data protection 
and privacy policies.41 The debate was complicated by the fact that 
                                                
36 See Monty Python, supra note 1. 
37 On the emergence of privacy as a central U.S. policy concern, see generally Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and The Right 
[Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121 (2015). On the global dimensions of data 
collection and privacy, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 
150–84 (2014). 
38 See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 145–328 (2016) (discussing development of FTC as principal U.S. privacy 
regulator). We are currently working on an article that explores how the FTC ended up, 
partly by choice, but largely by accident, as the nation’s primary privacy agency. David A. 
Hyman & William E. Kovacic, By Accident or Design? The Future Institutional Framework 
for U.S. Data Protection and Privacy Regulation (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file 
with authors). 
39 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Closes Google/DoubleClick Investigation (Dec. 
20, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/12/federal-trade-
commission-closes-googledoubleclick-investigation [hereinafter FTC Google/DoubleClick 
Press Release]. 
40 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Closes its Investigation of Google 
AdMob Deal (May 21, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/05/ftc-
closes-its-investigation-google-admob-deal [herinafter FTC Google AdMob Press Release].  
41 See FTC Google/DoubleClick Press Release, supra, note 38; FTC Google AdMob Press 
Release, supra note 40. 
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different units within the FTC were responsible for merger review (i.e., the 
Bureau of Competition)42 and data protection and privacy (i.e., the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection).43 The FTC clearly had the legal authority to 
review Google’s proposed acquisitions of DoubleClick and AdMob.44 It 
also had the legal authority to investigate Google’s data protection and 
privacy policies.45 But agency personnel disagreed on whether the merger 
review should be used as an excuse/pretext/justification to delve into 
Google’s data protection and privacy policies.46  
Some agency personnel (most of whom were in the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection) thought the issue was a no-brainer.47 Of course the 
FTC should take advantage of the fact that Google was seeking to acquire 
DoubleClick and AdMob to investigate these issues—and use the merger 
approval process to extract appropriate concessions to ensure that 
consumers’ interests were protected. Others (most of whom were in the 
Bureau of Competition) were concerned that (i) merger review was 
supposed to focus on antitrust and harms to competition, rather than serve 
as a means to achieve the agency’s data protection and privacy aims; (ii) 
opening this particular can of worms would mean that the outcome of a 
merger review could turn on whether the FTC or DOJ was conducting the 
evaluation (since the FTC was more concerned with data security and 
privacy than DOJ); and (iii) by making clear that merger review outcomes 
could vary significantly depending upon which agency got the file, the 
FTC’s use of the HSR process to implement privacy and data protection 
policy would lead Congress to reassess the wisdom of having two federal 
antitrust agencies share merger enforcement authority—an assessment that 
might lead to the consolidation of all merger-control duties in the DOJ.   
Ultimately, the FTC did not use the Google-DoubleClick or the 
Google-AdMob merger review process to extract concessions from Google 
regarding its data protection and privacy policies. Indeed, the FTC’s closing 
statement in DoubleClick explicitly disclaimed such strategies, noting that 
“the sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is 
to identify and remedy transactions that harm competition.”48 The FTC 
                                                
42 Bureau of Competition, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-competition (last visited June 30, 2016). 
43 Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection (last visited June 30, 2016). 
44 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012).  
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012).  
46 See FTC Google/DoubleClick Press Release, supra note 39. 
47 As noted previously, one of us (Kovacic) served in various positions at the FTC from 
2006-2011 when Google sought regulatory approval to acquire Double Click and AdMob.  
See supra note *.   
48 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-
0170, at 2 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-
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accordingly concluded that it lacked the legal authority to block or 
condition approval of the transaction on non-antitrust grounds—which 
would include data protection and privacy grounds.49 The closing 
statement, joined by Chairman Majoras, and Commissioners Kovacic, 
Leibowitz, and Rosch, also noted that the data protection and privacy issues 
were not specific to Google-DoubleClick but extended to the entire online 
advertising marketplace.50 As such, using the merger review process to 
implement data protection and privacy regulation created a significant risk 
of disparate treatment, and non-uniform enforcement of the law.51 
Interestingly, although Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbor dissented, she 
agreed it would be inappropriate to use the merger review process to 
implement data protection and privacy regulations.52  
 
C. Leveraging Across Policy Domains Occupied by Separate 
Regulators 
 
Although the FTC declined to engage in regulatory leveraging to 
deal with data protection and privacy, other regulators do not share that 
view. In March 2014, the European Data Protection Supervisor issued an 
opinion suggesting that European competition authorities should take 
account of data protection and privacy concerns when deciding whether to 
approve a merger.53 In effect, this would mean that the merger review 
process will be used as the occasion (and opportunity) to impose 
substantive privacy regulations on the merging entity. An alternative 
approach, embraced by the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Competition (DG-Comp), is to reframe the competition analysis to take 
account of data privacy concerns, and examine whether the merger has the 
                                                                                                             
commstmt.pdf.  
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 1–2. 
51 See id. at 2 (“Not only does the Commission lack legal authority to require conditions to 
this merger that do not relate to antitrust, regulating the privacy requirements of just one 
company could itself pose a serious detriment to competition in this vast and rapidly 
evolving industry.”). 
52 Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dissenting Statement Regarding In 
re Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007), at 10, http://www 
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-
mattergoogle/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf. As elaborated in a later work, 
Commissioner Harbour proposed that privacy should be considered a qualitative dimension 
of competition. Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An 
Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 773–74 (2010).  
53 See European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big 
Data: The Interplay Between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection 
in the Digital Economy 22–23, (March 2014), 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultati
on/Opinions/2014/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf. 
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effect of reducing the ability and willingness of the parties to provide 
adequate levels of data protection.54  
The issue is not limited to merger control. In March 2016, 
Germany’s competition agency, the Bundeskartellamt, announced that it 
had begun an investigation of whether Facebook’s privacy practices 
constitute an “abuse of [dominant] market power” that would violate 
Germany’s antitrust laws.55 At an antitrust conference in Washington, D.C., 
the EC Commissioner for Competition, Margarethe Vestager, spoke 
approvingly of the German initiative.56 
The precise motivation for the Bundeskartellamt investigation of 
Facebook is unclear. We can only speculate about what factors led agency 
officials to commence the matter. The investigation may reflect a belief that 
competition law is a suitable tool to force dominant firms to observe 
privacy law mandates, or to set broader policy for the digital economy. 
Alternatively, perhaps the Bundeskartellamt embraces the aims of 
Germany’s data protection regime and views competition law as a more 
effective tool to achieve these aims, compared to the direct application of 
                                                
54 Eric Auchard, EU Competition Chief to Eye ‘Big Data’ Concerns in Merger Probes, 
REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-data-competition-
idUSKCN0UV0ZG. This approach would treat privacy protection as a qualitative dimension 
of competition, as firms distinguish themselves by providing stronger, or weaker, assurances 
about how they will handle information obtained about consumer preferences. See also 
Harbour & Koslov, supra note 50, at 770–74 (suggesting how privacy issues can be 
accounted for within an antitrust assessment of competitive effects). 
55 Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Initiates Proceeding Against 
Facebook on Suspicion of Having Abused Its Market Power by Infringing Data Protection 
Rules (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_
2016_Facebook.html (“There is an initial suspicion that Facebook’s conditions of use are in 
violation of data protection provisions. Not every law infringement on the part of a dominant 
company is also relevant under competition law. However, in the case in question 
Facebook’s use of unlawful terms and conditions could represent an abusive imposition of 
unfair conditions on users. The Bundeskartellamt will examine, among other issues, to what 
extent a connection exists between the possibly dominant position of the company and the 
use of such clauses.”). Facebook has been the subject of close scrutiny by European privacy 
regulators. See Sam Schechner & Natalia Drozdiak, Facebook Faces Privacy Suit in Europe 
as Scrutiny Increases, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2015, at B5; see also Guy Chazan & Duncan 
Robinson, Facebook Hit by German Competition Probe, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f4afa34-e05e-11e5-96b7-
9f778349aba2.html#axzz45ztsHvWq. 
56 See Jeff Zalesin, Attys Must Flag Problems in M&A, Enforcers Say, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/782405/print?section=competition (“Vestager said 
that Germany’s current antitrust investigation into Facebook Inc.’s data protection practices 
could make ‘a very valuable contribution’ to the understanding of how privacy and 
competition interact.”); see also Jeff Zalesin, EU Embraces Support Role in Facebook 
Antitrust Probe, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/768063/eu-
embraces-support-role-in-facebook-antitrust-probe.  
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German privacy law by the country’s privacy regulators.57 Finally, the 
Facebook matter could be a turf battle—an effort by the Bundeskartellamt 
to preempt efforts by German privacy regulators to achieve greater control 
over the digital economy and its leading high technology participants.  
Whatever the explanation turns out to be, the Facebook 
investigation is a striking example of the use of competition law to enforce 
obligations that originate in non-antitrust domains—in this instance, data 
protection. The Bundeskartellamt’s announcement of the Facebook inquiry 
disavowed the use of competition law to treat “every law infringement . . . 
[by] a dominant company” as a competition law violation.58 Even so, one 
can imagine many instances in which a dominant firm’s misconduct (e.g., a 
violation of laws governing environmental protection) injures consumer 
interests, and distorts consumer choice, by enabling the dominant firm to 
use noncompliance with other laws to gain a competitive advantage 
(specifically, the avoidance of costs that would be incurred to comply) over 
rivals that obey the rules. In effect, this would make the competition agency 
the backstop enforcer of a potentially large collection of other laws, at least 
with respect to dominant enterprises.59 
One additional example of leveraging across agencies comes from 
the U.S., and involves the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”). In 2013, Ally Financial was seeking approval from the Federal 
Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to convert from a 
bank holding company to a financial holding company.60 It was also being 
investigated by the CFPB, an independent bureau located within the 
                                                
57 Privacy is a fundamental human right under EU law. See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 8–9 (2015) (setting out the foundations and 
content of EU data protection law). For this reason, one might argue that all competition 
authorities within the EU, at the Commission level and within the member states, have an 
obligation to account for privacy in applying competition law. We are grateful to Orla 
Lynskey for this point.  
58 See Bundeskartellamt, supra note 53. 
59 The full implications of such an approach were suggested in an extraordinary proposal, 
advanced by FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk in the late 1970s, that the Commission 
might use its authority (to prohibit unfair methods of competition) to challenge 
noncompliance with legal obligations governing environmental protection, immigration, and 
worker safety. The FTC never implemented this theory of enforcement, but Pertschuk’s 
proposal starkly framed the question of when noncompliance with other regulatory 
commands should serve as a basis for antitrust liability. This episode is analyzed in William 
MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer Protection Finds Its Limits in 
Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 943, 952–54 (2005).    
60 Yuka Hayashi, Consumer Watchdog Pushed Discrimination Case on Vulnerable Firm: 
Report, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-watchdog-
pushed-discrimination-case-on-vulnerable-firm-report-1448404301. See also Rachel 
Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates Potential Discrimination, Documents Show, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/cfpb-overestimates-
potential-discrimination-documents-show-1076742-1.html.  
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Federal Reserve.61 Although the CFPB has no regulatory authority over 
auto dealers,62 it decided to investigate whether the loan portfolios of 
indirect auto lenders such as Ally indicated that auto dealers were offering 
less favorable terms to minority borrowers.63 
According to the former CEO of Ally, the CFPB “threatened to 
derail [Ally’s] efforts to obtain key regulatory approvals if it didn’t agree to 
settle,” by paying $100 million, and begin offering below-market rates to 
minorities.64 He complained that Ally had been “strong-armed” by a 
regulator that “absolutely knew they had tremendous leverage over us,” and 
was trying to change industry policy with a trumped-up case.65  
Internal CFPB memos confirm that agency personnel knew that 
Ally needed to obtain regulatory approval, and the impending deadline to 
obtain that approval gave Ally a very strong incentive to settle its dispute 
with the CFPB.66 Absent the need to obtain approval from the Federal 
Reserve, Ally could have forced the CFPB to prove its case in court—and 
there were major weaknesses in the CFPB’s case.67 It is impossible to know 
                                                
61 We address the unusual institutional status of the CFPB in Hyman & Kovacic, Why Who 
Does What Matters, supra note 8, at 1487–90.  
62 See 12 U.S.C. § 5519 (2012). 
63 Hayashi, supra note 58. 
64 Paul Sperry, Bank CEO Reveals How Obama Administration Shook Him Down, N.Y. 
POST (Feb. 21, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/02/21/bank-ceo-reveals-how-obama-
administration-shook-him-down (“The former CEO of Ally Financial Inc. says the Obama 
administration abused its power by holding the bank’s business hostage in order to coerce a 
record settlement of ‘trumped-up’ racism charges and push profit-killing new regulations on 
the entire auto-lending industry . . . . Michael A. Carpenter, who helmed Detroit-based Ally 
from 2009 to 2015, complained in an exclusive interview that Obama’s powerful consumer 
watchdog agency threatened to derail the bank’s efforts to obtain key regulatory approvals if 
it didn’t agree to settle the allegations out of court.”). 
65 Id.  
66 Hayashi, supra note 60; Witkowski, supra note 60. 
67 Sperry, supra note 64 (noting the former CEO asserted “we would have fought the 
CFPB’s trumped-up accusations in every court in the land” if Ally hadn’t needed to obtain 
regulatory approval.) The weaknesses included relying on decidedly imperfect proxies to 
determine whether a particular consumer was a minority, and the CFPB’s failure to take 
account of credit scores in evaluating loan terms. Witkowski, supra note 58. Lending new 
meaning to the phrase “good enough for government work,” the CFPB argued it was better 
to over-estimate disparities than to under-estimate them. Id. So much for Blackstone’s 
observation, “better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” See 
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (quoting 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352). Similarly, the CFPB argued that credit ratings did not 
“reflect a legitimate business need.” In re Ally Fin. Inc., 2013 CFPB Admin. Proc. LEXIS 
125 at P 26  
(Dec. 20, 2013) (Consent Order). It also sought damages for emotional distress. Sean 
Higgins, Consumer Bureau Overestimating Numbers Hurt by Discrimination, WASHINGTON 
EXAMINER (Sept. 18, 2015) http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/consumer-bureau-
overestimating-numbers-hurt-by-discrimination/article/2572419. It seems unlikely the CFPB 
would fare well if it took these aggressive positions in actual litigation before an Article III 
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how the counterfactual would have played out, but it seems extraordinarily 
unlikely the CFPB would have been able to extract $100 million and a 
change in Ally’s business practices—let alone do so under the same time 
frame—except under conditions that gave the CFPB an extraordinary 
degree of regulatory leverage.  
 
D. Leveraging with a “Public Interest” Mandate  
 
Many statutes delegate expansive regulatory authority by requiring 
an agency to attend to the “public interest” in making decisions.68 For 
example, in evaluating proposed transactions involving licenses, the 
Federal Communications Commission is required to evaluate whether the 
transaction will serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”69 In 
reviewing mergers, state public utility commissions operate under replicas 
of the federal public interest rules, and can use their gatekeeping powers to 
obtain various concessions involving community services.70 
These “public interest” standards make it easy for agencies to 
engage in regulatory leveraging.71 The FCC recently used the merger 
review process to strong-arm Charter Communications to “live up to 
stringent requirements that don’t apply to its bigger rivals,” including net 
neutrality standards that the FCC has been unable to impose through direct 
regulation.72 Over the past decade, the FCC has used this strategy to impose 
                                                                                                             
judge.  
68 For example, a number of jurisdictions have incorporated a public interest test in the 
merger control provisions of their competition laws. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Public Interest Considerations in Merger Control, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/public-interest-considerations-in-merger-control.htm 
(last visited June 30, 2016).  
69 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(e)(2) & 310(d) (2012). See also Jon Sallet, FCC Transaction Review: 
Competition and the Public Interest, FCC Blog (Aug. 12, 2014, 12:39 PM), 
https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2014/08/12/fcc-transaction-review-competition-and-
public-interest.  
70 See Erik Filipink, Serving the “Public Interest”—Traditional vs Expansive Utility 
Regulation 3 (Nat’l Reg. Research Inst. Working Paper, Report No. 10-02, 2009), 
http://www.energycollection.us/Energy-Regulators/Serving-Public-Interest.pdf.  
71 See, e.g., Brendan Sasso, How Mega-Mergers Give the FCC Stealth Power for Net 
Neutrality, ATLANTIC (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/how-mega-mergers-give-the-fcc-
stealth-power-for-net-neutrality/456969.  
72 Shalini Ramachandran and John D. McKinnon, Regulators Recommend Approval of 
Charter-Time Warner Cable Deal, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 25, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-recommend-approval-of-charter-time-warner-cable-
deal-1461611989 (“Under a deal with the U.S. Justice Department and Federal 
Communications Commission, Charter agreed to abandon for seven years several common 
industry practices that the government feared could threaten the growth of rival online video 
providers such as Netflix Inc. and Hulu. The company agreed not to impose data caps or 
charge broadband Internet customers based on data usage, practices that have riled 
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net neutrality constraints on AT&T, Verizon, BellSouth, Comcast, and 
NBC.73 The FCC has also used regulatory leveraging in other domains: two 
decades ago, the chairman of the FCC used the merger review process to 
strong-arm Westinghouse into increasing the number of hours devoted to 
children’s educational programming on CBS.74  
It is not just the federal government that takes advantage of 
regulatory leveraging. In March 2016, the District of Columbia Public 
Service Commission conditioned its approval of the Exelon-Pepco merger 
on a host of ancillary provisions.75 The public service commission had 
rejected the transaction twice previously,76 but reversed field once the 
parties provided a sufficiently large inducement to do so—in the form of a 
commitment to relocate certain offices to D.C.; the hiring of unionized 
workers; and at least $1.9 million in annual average charitable contributions 
to organizations located in D.C. or benefiting D.C. residents.77  
 
III. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REGULATORY LEVERAGING 
 
To make the benefits and costs of regulatory leveraging more 
concrete, imagine that you represent a multinational entity that has 
proposed a substantial merger. You arrive at a meeting with personnel from 
the DOJ Antitrust Division to discuss the merger. You sit down, and find a 
bunch of people sitting in the room. You say, “I recognize some of the 
people here. We’ve had discussions with them. Here is the front office from 
the antitrust division. Here are the case handlers. But can you introduce me 
                                                                                                             
customers. Charter will also be required to build out its broadband access to two million 
homes, which would compel it to compete against other cable companies in some markets, 
according to a person familiar with the matter.”).  
73 Marvin Ammori, Here’s How Charter Will Commit to an Open Internet, WIRED (June 25, 
2015) http://www.wired.com/2015/06/heres-charter-will-commit-open-internet. 
74 Edmund L. Andrews, FCC Approval Seen Today For Westinghouse-CBS Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 22, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/22/business/the-media-business-
fcc-approval-seen-today-for-westinghouse-cbs-deal.html. Interestingly, there was an internal 
dispute within the agency on this issue, with the chairman insisting on linking approval of 
the deal to the pledge to increase children’s programming, and three commissioners insisting 
that the FCC should make it clear that “it was in no way demanding that CBS or 
Westinghouse meet any quantitative requirements for children’s programming as a condition 
of approval.” Id.  
75 See Ben Nuckols, District Of Columbia Regulators Voted For A Second Time Friday To 
Reject A Proposed $6.8 Billion Merger Between Power Companies Exelon And Pepco, But 
They Said The Deal Would Go Forward If New Conditions Are Met, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Feb. 26, 2016, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-02-26/dc-
regulators-reject-exelon-pepco-deal-but-could-reconsider. 
76 Thomas Heath & Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Panel Backs Pepco-Exelon Merger, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 24, 2016, at B1. 
77 In re Joint Application of Exelon Corp. et al., Pub. Serv. Comm’n. of the Dist. of 
Columbia, Order No. 18148 ¶¶ CC, DD, HH (Mar. 23, 2016), available at 
http://wtop.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PSC-order-Pepco-Exelon.pdf. 
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to the rest of the people in the room?” The responses come back fast and 
furious. “I’m from the DOJ Tax Division.” “I’m from the DOJ Civil Rights 
Division.” “I handle government contracts matters for DOJ’s Civil 
Division.” “I’m from the EEOC.” “I’m from the CFPB.” “I’m from the 
EPA.”  
Understandably enough, you respond, “What are these people 
doing here? I’m here to discuss our merger—and just the merger. Those 
disputes are handled by other lawyers. I don’t know anything about them.” 
The head of the merger review team responds, “Well, we’re going to talk 
about the merger—but we’ve got a whole lot of other issues that we’d also 
like to resolve with your client. All those other loose ends are getting in the 
way of our ability to analyze the proposed merger. The Attorney General 
has instructed me to tell you that if you’re willing to concede each and 
every one of these other matters, we can wrap everything up right now, and 
get your merger out the door by the end of the week. Or your client can 
litigate with all of us over these issues—and it will take as long as it takes. 
But the merger won’t be considered until everything else is resolved. It’s 
your choice.”  
How would you react? What arguments would defenders of 




The most obvious benefit of regulatory leveraging is that it 
promotes more comprehensive settlements. Going back to our first case 
study (Bosch-SPX), the FTC already had an open file on SPX, and Bosch 
then came to the FTC with the proposed merger.78 Isn’t it more efficient to 
enter into one global settlement instead of maintaining two separate 
proceedings? If there are benefits in settlement (and there are), more 
comprehensive settlements must be better still.  
Second, depending on the statutory language employed, leveraging 
may be an authorized delegation of congressional authority to deal with 
difficult problems in a flexible way. Stated differently, Congress used 
“public interest” language to give the agency a hammer that could be 
deployed when a regulated entity comes to the agency for merger 
approval.79 But the agency can only use the hammer in carefully defined 
circumstances. The regulated entity can always walk away from the merger, 
and continue fighting about the ancillary matter(s). This structure keeps the 
agency from expanding its regulatory leverage beyond any given 
                                                
78 See supra Part II.A. 
79 See generally Filipink, supra note 68 (identifying various ways in which the “public 
interest” standard has been used by regulators to reach issues that are not typically 
understood to be within the regulator’s jurisdiction). 
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transaction, while giving it the flexibility to solve problems without going 
through the drudgery of rulemaking, or starting a separate case.  
Even when the agency operates without the benefit of a public 
interest mandate, leveraging might be viewed as an admirable example of 
administrative adaptability and creativity. A regulator could defend its 
unwillingness to address a serious problem by pointing to the limits of its 
powers, and by interpreting those powers in a cramped way that justifies 
passivity. By contrast to this cautious view of public administration, the 
regulator that leverages its powers to solve difficult problems is being 
inventive and entrepreneurial. And if the agency goes too far, the courts and 




Regulatory leveraging also involves real risks and disadvantages. 
For starters, regulatory leveraging leads to less disciplined decisionmaking 
by governmental agencies. Substantive antitrust law governs merger 
reviews,80 but regulatory leveraging encourages agencies to ignore or 
downgrade these controls. The result is the discounting of both process and 
substance, in favor of the unimpeded pursuit of more nebulous (and often 
contestable) goals. Among other consequences, this comes at a 
considerable cost in predictability for affected commercial parties. 
Second, regulatory leveraging leads to decisionmaking that is less 
transparent and less accountable. Merger review rarely ends up in court,81 
so agency leadership need only persuade itself that its “wish list” is worth 
pursuing. Firms badly want to obtain immediate approval of their 
mergers,82 so agency leadership has them over a barrel. Because the “wish 
list” of desired concessions is achieved through settlement, in many 
jurisdictions it is, by definition, not subject to appeal.  
Third, if multiple agencies handle merger review, the agency that 
uses regulatory leveraging may place itself at a disadvantage. Currently, the 
FTC and DOJ both conduct merger reviews.83 The two agencies allocate 
matters between each other chiefly on the basis of recent experience with 
specific industries. Once word gets around that the FTC (and only the FTC) 
is engaging in regulatory leveraging, industries that fall within the FTC’s 
purview likely will complain to Congress. If that happens, Congress is 
likely to reexamine the logic of having two agencies in the merger review 
space. Certainly, FTC personnel were well aware of this risk when they 
                                                
80 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
81 See BRODER, supra note 20, at 189–90 (“As a practical matter, the threat of such a suit, or 
the filing of the complaint, is often enough to dissuade parties from proceeding at all.”).  
82 See id.  
83 Id. at 189. 
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were considering whether to use leveraging in evaluating Google-
DoubleClick and Google-AdMob.84 
Fourth, regulatory leveraging can be used for “good” or “evil.” 
Privacy and data security standards don’t have an obvious ideological or 
partisan valence—but would people be quite so complacent about 
regulatory leveraging if they knew that the competition agency was going 
to be run by their worst enemy? Stated more concretely, what if the 
competition agency demanded one or more of the following as a condition 
of approving a merger involving the listed companies: 
 
*Apple had to agree to unlock any iPhone provided to it by 
the Department of Homeland Security, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration, or the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 
*Verizon had to agree to provide immediate and 
unrestricted access to the text messages associated with any 
subscriber’s number, without requiring a warrant or 
notifying the subscriber, upon request by any federal, state, 
or local governmental entity. 
*Google had to create a backdoor to Gmail, and turn it over 
to the National Security Agency. 
*Salesforce had to fire its CEO, who was the ringleader of 
corporate attempts to pressure Republican state lawmakers 
on social issues.85 For every dollar Salesforce had to pay its 
CEO to go away, it had to pay ten times that amount to 
support the Tea Party.  
*PayPal had to reverse its decision to cancel a $3.6 million 
operations center in Charlotte, North Carolina, in response 
to the state’s enactment of the “Public Facilities Privacy 
and Security Act.”86 PayPal also had to spend at least twice 
that amount endowing a center at the University of North 
Carolina for the study of the War of Northern Aggression. 
Finally, each member of PayPal’s board and senior 
management (including vegetarians, vegans, and those with 
                                                
84 See supra Part II.B. 
85 Monica Langley, Salesforce’s Marc Benioff Has Kicked Off New Era of Corporate Social 
Activism, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/salesforces-marc-benioff-
has-kicked-off-new-era-of-corporate-social-activism-1462201172.  
86 Susanna Kim, Boycott Over North Carolina’s LGBT ‘Bathroom Law’ May Be Gaining 
Traction as Economic Fallout Grows, ABCNEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/boycott-north-carolinas-lgbt-bathroom-law-gaining-
traction/story?id=38367656. The law bans people from using bathrooms that don’t match 
the sex indicated on their birth certificates.  
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religious objections to eating pork) had to spend a week 
eating only Carolina BBQ and drinking sweet tea, after 
which they had to personally hand-write a five-page essay 
on the virtues of that diet.87 
*All companies seeking merger approval had to make large 
contributions to foundations created and administered by 
the antitrust regulators. The funds may be used for any 
purpose the regulators deem appropriate. 
 
How do you like regulatory leveraging now?  
 
Fifth, once it becomes clear that regulatory leveraging is what well-
established first-world regulators do, it will be much more difficult to 
persuade competition authorities in other nations not to take advantage of 
the same opportunities. This will prove to be a particularly challenging 
problem in countries where competition authorities are struggling to deal 
with political interference in their decision-making process, and outright 
corruption.  
Finally, because regulatory leveraging is merger-specific, it creates 
firm-specific discontinuities in the applicable law. Only firms that have had 
a merger reviewed by the agency will be subject to regulatory leverage—
and the details of the resulting settlements may well vary, depending on the 
priorities of agency leadership at the time the merger was reviewed, and the 
extent to which firm management was willing to give away the store to get 
the merger approved. Of course, regulatory leveraging during the merger 
review process can deliver a clear signal about the agency’s preferences— 
and firms might fall into line voluntarily, even if they do not anticipate 
pursuing a merger anytime soon.88 But some firms may resist, and others 
may simply ignore the strong hints being dropped by the agency. In 
combination, these dynamics are likely to create significant firm-specific 
discontinuities in the rule of law.89 Those discontinuities will have bad 
                                                
87 Obviously, the antitrust agencies could not constitutionally require PayPal’s Board of 
Directors to each complete a 5-page essay extolling the virtues of sweet tea and Carolina 
BBQ. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).  
88 See Jerry Brito, “Agency Threats” and the Rule of Law: An Offer You Can’t Refuse, 37 
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 553, 553 (2012); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L. J. 1841 
1841–42 (2011).  
89 There is some evidence that the CFPB’s campaign against discriminatory auto lending has 
had exactly this result. Rachel Witkowski, The Inside Story of the CFPB’s Battle Over Auto 
Lending, AM. BANKER (Sep. 24, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-
regulation/the-inside-story-of-the-cfpbs-battle-over-auto-lending-1076940-
1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1. 
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results, including impeding the development of a robust market for mergers 
and acquisitions.  
 
IV. SQUARING THE REGULATORY LEVERAGING CIRCLE  
 
How should the conundrum of regulatory leveraging be addressed? 
Following Professor James Q. Wilson, we propose “a few modest 
suggestions that may make a small difference.”90  
 
A. Express Delegations of Authority 
 
If Congress wants agencies to engage in regulatory leveraging, it 
should explicitly authorize the process, and identify some boundaries. 
Should agencies only engage in leveraging for substantive areas of law 
within their zone of regulatory authority, or should they be allowed to range 
more widely? If agencies range beyond their own zone of regulatory 
authority, should it be only at the request (or at least with the concurrence) 
of the agency that is actually responsible for that substantive area? What 
criteria should an agency employ in deciding whether to engage in 
regulatory leveraging? How long can an agency hold up a regulated entity, 
seeking to get concessions? What counts as a reasonable basis for holding 
up the regulated entity? Can an agency demand something that it cannot 
directly impose, either because of limitations in its own regulatory 
authority, or because doing so would be unconstitutional? And so on.  
Simply stated, an express congressional delegation of authority 
would go a long way in legitimating the use of regulatory leveraging. The 
absence of an express delegation of authority should be understood as 
equally dispositive in the opposite direction. Expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius. 
 
B. More Transparency 
 
Agencies should be much more explicit about what they are doing 
in the regulatory leveraging space. This will simultaneously discipline their 
use of regulatory leveraging, and force them to articulate and justify their 
use of this tool. If an agency believes that regulatory leveraging is a 
sensible way of solving a problem it confronts, the agency should 
forthrightly explain and justify its actions. If an agency isn’t willing to brag 
about what it is doing, it probably shouldn’t be doing it. Sunlight may not 
be a perfect disinfectant, but if regulators can’t stand the heat, they should 
get out of the kitchen.  
                                                
90 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO 
IT 369 (1989).  
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C. Fewer Gates  
 
More gates means more gatekeepers—and more opportunities for 
regulatory leveraging. The obvious solution is to be exceedingly careful 
about creating new gates, and revisit the necessity of existing gates. So, 
before creating any new gates, legislators should explicitly decide whether 
they are absolutely necessary—and if so, whether the responsible agency 
may engage in regulatory leveraging, and the circumstances under which 
leveraging can occur. Legislators should also “sunset” all gates, forcing 
routine reconsideration of the necessity of each gate.  
 
D. Better Norms  
 
Regulatory leveraging is, at best, a third-best solution for dealing 
with policy problems. In some instances, internal political dynamics will 
discourage the use of regulatory leveraging.91 But a robust norm against the 
use of regulatory leveraging will play a useful backup role in disciplining 
the inappropriate exercise of gatekeeping authority.  
 
                                                
91 See supra notes 36–50, 67 and accompanying text (discussing internal political constraints 
on use of regulatory leveraging by the FTC and FCC). 
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E. Ex Post Review 
 
As always, more data would be helpful. We don’t know how often 
regulatory leveraging takes place, the circumstances under which it occurs, 
and how effective (or ineffective) it actually is. There have been complaints 
about the exercise of regulatory leverage by multiple entities within the 
federal government, including the CFPB,92 FCC,93 FDA,94 and the 
Department of Education.95 At the state and local level, many “takings” 
cases involve similar instances of regulatory exactions, including the 
compelled surrender of land to create bicycle or pedestrian paths,96 and 
cash settlements to be controlled and disbursed by the regulators.97 And 
there are the long-standing arguments over “unconstitutional conditions” 
and the spending power.98 
                                                
92 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.  
93 See Sasso, supra note 69.  
94 More specifically, the FDA’s prohibition of off-label marketing is a clear example of the 
FDA leveraging its authority over drug labeling. See Peter J. Henning, FDA’s ‘Off-Label’ 
Drug Policy Leads to Free Speech Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/dealbook/fdas-off-label-drug-policy-leads-to-
free-speech-fight.html?_r=0. Similarly, although the FDA is prohibited from regulating the 
practice of medicine, it has used its authority over drug approvals to limit the circumstances 
under which certain drugs can be prescribed. See 15 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner 
to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or 
disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”). See also PAUL D. 
CLEMENT & LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CLINICAL LABORATORY ASSOCIATION WHITE 
PAPER: LABORATORY TESTING SERVICES, AS THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, CANNOT BE 
REGULATED AS MEDICAL DEVICES 11–12 (2015) available at http://www.acla.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Tribe-Clement-White-Paper-1-6-15.pdf (highlighting 
“Congress[’s] longstanding reluctance to interfere with the practice of medicine, which is 
underscored by an express statutory disclaimer of such inference.”). The first form of 
leveraging is likely inconsistent with the Constitution; the second form of leveraging is 
likely inconsistent with the FDA’s enabling legislation.  
95 Emma Brown, U.S. Senator: Education Dept. Overstepped Authority on Sexual Assault 
Complaints, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/01/07/u-s-senator-education-
department-overstepped-authority-on-sexual-assault-complaints/. 
96 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987).  
97 City of New York v. 17 Vista Assocs., 642 N.E.2d 606, 607 (N.Y. 1994) (“After the 
Institute presented its case for an exemption, the City, . . . ‘made it clear’ that the exemption 
would not be granted unless the Institute and Vista each made a substantial payment to the 
City to benefit the homeless. Resolution of the Institute’s entitlement to the exemption 
would have taken considerable time due to the need for an independent investigation, and 
the Institute allegedly needed the proceeds of the sale immediately to remain in operation . . 
. the City, therefore, decided to grant the Institute the exemption, without conducting the 
usual independent evaluation, provided Vista paid $500,000 into a trust created to provide 
low- and middle-income housing without restriction to seamen. The Institute was also to 
contribute $1,000,000 from the proceeds of the sale to the trust, known as the 15 State Street 
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That said, we don’t know nearly enough about the prevalence and 
results of regulatory leverage. Only a consistent practice of ex post review 
can cast light on these issues.  
 
V. LEVERAGING REGULATORS  
 
To this point, we have focused on regulators leveraging private 
entities.  But, under some circumstances, private parties may be able to 
leverage regulators.  We intend to address that issue at greater length in 
another article -- so we limit our analysis of leveraging regulators to one 
recent high profile example.  As part of its review of the proposed merger 
between Aetna and Humana, the DOJ asked Aetna what the consequences 
would be if the merger was not approved.  Aetna’s CEO responded in a 
July 5, 2016 letter as follows:  
                                                                                                             
Housing Trust, of which two named plaintiffs, City officials, were to serve as trustees.”). 
98 See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 1–12 (1993); Richard 
A. Epstein and Mario Loyola, The United State of America, ATLANTIC (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/the-federal-takeover-of-state-
governments/375270/. 
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Our analysis to date makes clear that if the deal 
were challenged and/or blocked we would need to take 
immediate actions to mitigate public exchange and ACA 
small group losses. Specifically, if the DOJ sues to enjoin 
the transaction, we will immediately take action to reduce 
our 2017 exchange footprint.   
We currently plan, as part of our strategy following 
the acquisition, to expand from 15 states in 2016 to 20 
states in 2017. However, if we are in the midst of litigation 
over the Humana transaction, given the risks described 
above, we will not be able to expand to the five additional 
states. 
In addition, we would also withdraw from at least 
five additional states where generating a market return 
would take too long for us to justify, given the costs 
associated with a potential breakup of the transaction. In 
other words, instead of expanding to 20 states next year, 
we would reduce our presence to no more than 10 states.99   
 
Stated differently: “Nice exchanges you’ve got here.  It would be a shame if 
anything was to happen to them.”100   
Why would this attempt at leveraging regulators have any traction?  
DOJ enforces the antitrust law.  It doesn’t care whether Aetna participates 
in the public exchanges created by the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“PPACA”).  But, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) and the White House care a great deal about the viability of the 
public exchanges.  PPACA (also known as “Obamacare” and as the  
“Affordable Care Act”) was the signature domestic political achievement of 
the Obama administration -- and the public exchanges were (and are) an 
essential part of that initiative.  The public exchanges were already facing 
significant difficulties because other insurers had either withdrawn or had 
issued threats/promises to do so.101  Those difficulties would be 
dramatically increased if Aetna pulled the plug on continued 
participation.102 
                                                
99 http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/AetnaDOJletter.pdf  
100 See supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
101 Anthem made a similar threat/promise regarding the approval of its proposed 
merger with Cigna.  Paul Demko, Anthem links Obamacare expansion with approval of 
Cigna acquisition, Politico, July 28, 2016, at 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/anthem-links-obamacare-expansion-with-approval-
of-cigna-acquisition-226374.  Humana had previously made a more veiled threat/promise.  
Bruce Japsen, Humana May Withdraw From Obamacare Exchanges, Forbes, Feb. 10, 2016, 
at http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/02/10/obamacare-losses-for-humana-
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In the end, Aetna’s attempt to leverage the regulators did not 
succeed.  DOJ challenged the Aetna-Humana merger.103  Aetna responded 
by dropping its exchange operations in 11 states.  That move doubtless 
caused considerable consternation at HHS and the White House --  but that 
was not enough leverage to get HHS and the White House to force DOJ to 
back off.104 
Of course, the success or failure of any given attempt at leveraging 
regulators is not the issue.  What matters is that this is a game that both 
sides can play.  Those who don’t like the leveraging of regulators – and use 
words like “blackmail,” “extortion,” and “strong-arming” to describe such 
conduct should at least consider the “sauce for the gander” implications of 




Regulators like leverage—and some of the time, it is the only 
available solution to a particular problem. But regulatory leverage raises 
very real risks and costs, which counsel for considerably greater caution 
than regulatory agencies have shown to date. Unless properly disciplined, 
regulatory leveraging becomes lawlessness.  
Some of the time, regulatory leveraging is a problem. And, some of 
the time, regulatory leveraging is the only available solution. This is not the 
kind of scenario that lends itself to a simple fix, over and above the 
suggestions we offer in Part IV.  
                                                                                                             
mean-potential-withdrawal-in-2017/#7abca6466761.  And, United Health Care had also 
announced that it was dramatically reducing its involvement in the public exchanges.  Paul 
R. La Monica, United Healthcare to exit most Obamacare, CNN Money, Apr. 19, 2016, at 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/19/investing/unitedhealthcare-obamacare-exchanges-aca/.         
102 Bob Bryan, Now We Know the Real Reason Aetna Bailed on Obamacare, Business 
Insider, Aug. 17, 2015, at http://www.businessinsider.com/aetna-humana-merger-reason-for-
leaving-obamacare-2016-8 (“The move was seen as a huge blow to the future of the act, 
making Aetna the third large insurer, after United Healthcare and Humana, to significantly 
reduce its Obamacare business.”)   
103 DOJ also challenged the Anthem-Cigna merger.  Both of those challenges are 
pending as this article goes to press.   
104 See Megan McArdle, Aetna’s Retreat From Obamacare is More Than It Seems, 
Bloomberg View, Aug. 16, 2016, at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-
16/aetna-s-retreat-from-obamacare-is-more-than-it-seems (“The calculation is further 
complicated by the fact that the exchanges and the mergers are regulated by different 
agencies. Health and Human Services ultimately oversees exchange operations, while the 
attorney general is the one trying to block the mergers.  They both work for the same 
president, of course.  But it would not be the first time that internecine battles between 
different parts of the same government further complicated an already complicated game.”)  
